A recent innovation in measuring inequality is the incorporation of adjustments to top incomes using data from tax authorities, revealing higher inequality. The thesis of this paper is that the incorporation of estimates of income from illicit financial flows (IFF), reflecting untaxed capital, may be as significant to national inequality -but with greater variation across countries. We propose a method of adjusting national inequality data for illicit flows, and present preliminary results. These estimates suggest that untaxed illicit flows could be as important as (taxed) top incomes to estimates of inequality -highlighting the importance of improving estimates of underlying illicit flows.
Introduction
In his 1954 presidential address to the American Economic Association, "Economic growth and income inequality", Kuznets (1955) : p. 1 noted the "unusual scarcity of data" plaguing this field of study. He went on to lay out five specifications of data that would be valuable, but noted that it began "to look like a statistical economist's pipe dream" (p. 2). In recent years, that pipe dream has begun to look rather more like an achievable aimbut important problems remain. These form a critical part of the broader problem of uncounted inequality ( Cobham 2014) , in which marginalized groups tend to be further excluded by their omission from surveys and other policy-sensitive data collation, while elites are able to exert and extend their power by excluding themselves from data collation processes that might give rise to policy implications -such as the taxation of offshore incomes.
While this challenge of the "uncounted" extends to all aspects of human development, this paper focuses on income in particular. At the bottom of the distribution, Carr-Hill (2013) argues that there are systematic omissions from survey data, estimated to extend potentially to some 250 million people worldwide or 3.5% of the world population. This is perhaps a small enough proportion that if it were spread evenly across the distribution it need not be a major cause for concern; but the groups in question are likely to be overwhelmingly those at the bottom end of national income distributions.
At the top end of the distribution in household surveys, meanwhile, there is the well-known evidence of non-response from high-income groups. Korinek, Mistiaen, and Ravallion (2005) survey a range of literature on overall non-response, showing it to be often as high as 30%. For US data, their model implies that upward corrections of the Gini index during the sample years 1998-2004 should range from 3.39 to 5.74 percentage points (raising the Gini from around 0.45 to 0.49-0.50). Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) use tax data on top incomes to generate similar US results, finding for 2006 a Gini 4.9 percentage points higher, at 0.519 as opposed to the original calculation of 0.470.
1 Two main approaches have been pursued for international analyses of missing top incomes, and we discuss these in the following section.
There is as yet no international analysis focusing specifically on untaxed income -and above all that which is deliberately hidden. Since the early 2000s, a growing "tax justice" movement has highlighted the importance of undeclared assets and income streams held offshore, and of parallel patterns of profit-shifting by multinational Andy Sumner is the corresponding author. ©2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
companies ( Seabrooke and Wigan 2013) . Various scholars (e.g. Zucman 2013 ) have sought to uncover elements of the broader phenomenon that we may consider under the label of "illicit financial flows (IFF)". This paper considers how estimates of national inequality are different if adjusted for such flows. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on IFF and tax evasion in particular, including questions of definition and critically evaluating different estimation approaches. In Section 3, we set out a range of approaches reflecting different inequality measures and different assumptions about the attribution of illicit incomes, and present our preliminary estimates. Section 4 concludes with discussion of the avenues of future research needed in order to improve such estimates.
Our key finding on the basis of our preliminary estimates is that this particular aspect of hidden or uncounted income inequality may be of equivalent scale to that revealed by the inclusion of top incomes tax data. However, we note that current estimates of illicit flows are unlikely to offer the granularity or degree of confidence to construct robust adjusted series, and we therefore highlight a number of proposals for financial transparency measures that could support better adjustments.
Illicit Financial Flows and Implications for National Income Distribution
This section is divided into three parts. First, we consider the nature and definition of IFF, with a view to considering the reasonableness of attributing this to undeclared top incomes. Second, we discuss methodological issues and availability of the leading IFF estimates. Finally, we compare briefly the two main approaches taken in international work aiming to combine top incomes tax data with household survey data, as the basis for our own estimates in Section 3.
Illicit Financial Flows
The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in 2015, include a global goal to curtail IFF. However, there is no agreed indicator. This reflects in part the relatively recent emergence of IFF as a major policy issue, and in part the difficulties of definition and of measurement.
The definition of "illicit" is broader than simple illegality, encompassing that which is forbidden by rules, law or custom.
2 The defining feature of IFF is therefore that they are hidden, rather than necessarily illegal, and where either the illicit origin of capital or the illicit nature of transactions undertaken is deliberately obscured. For example, aggressive corporate profit-shifting (often through the manipulation of transfer pricing) may well be legal (or at least, there may be a near-zero prospect of its being proved to be illegal evasion by a tax authority with very limited capacity); but because the extent of the behaviour would be seen as in opposition to social expectations of paying a "fair share" of tax, the activity may still be hidden through use of subsidiaries in more opaque jurisdictions.
The most well-known classification of IFF stems from Baker (2005) , who popularized the term, and disaggregates IFF into three elements: commercial tax evasion (estimated at up to two thirds of the total), the laundering of the proceeds of crime (up to a third), and corrupt payments and the theft of state assets (3-5% of the total). Table 1 provides a broader overview of the transaction types, which can be clustered into four main types by motivation (see final column): 1 -market/regulatory abuse, 2 -tax abuse, 3 -abuse of power, including the theft of state funds and assets, and 4 -proceeds of crime. All four IFF types are likely to result in reductions in both state funds and institutional strength. The typology is unlikely to be comprehensive because there is potential to engineer an illicit flow in any transaction, and the range of potential illicit motivations is wide indeed; but nonetheless demonstrates the breadth of IFF phenomena. There is substantial overlap in the mechanisms used for IFF, regardless of motivation. The opportunity to hide, where it exists, is likely to be exploited for multiple purposes -so that identifying illicit flows in a particular mechanism will tend to be insufficient to specify the type of IFF in action. This raises two particular issues for research into income distributional impacts. First, IFFs include income that would not exist if all laws applied -namely the proceeds of crime, and the tax component of tax evading flows. Our concern here is not with the legal, or otherwise appropriate income distribution, but rather with the actual distribution, and so it is reasonable to allocate even illegal IFF income accordingly.
The second issue is that a major type of IFF, that related to multinationals' profit-shifting, will in the great majority of cases accrue to people outside the particular country in question -and so should not be allocated to the national income distribution. Usefully, profit-shifting by multinationals is one area of IFFs where the estimation is largely separable -and so we are able to use estimates which (largely) reflect other IFFs. To the extent that full separation is impossible, however, note that this creates some risk of over-allocating income domestically in what follows.
Leading IFF Estimates
As noted, we do not here focus on multinational profit-shifting since the likely implications for national income distribution are limited. That literature (see e.g. Cobham and Janský 2015; Crivelli, Keen, and de Mooij 2015) is largely self-contained, drawing variously from data on multinationals' balance sheets and/or survey and foreign direct investment (FDI) data to identify anomalies in the distribution of the international corporate tax base. Most IFF approaches focus instead on anomalies in the capital account (unrecorded capital movements) and in the current account (via mispriced trade, which is assessed to be dominated by unrelated party transactions rather than multinationals' intra-group profit shifting).
For capital account anomalies, the two most commonly used methods are the world bank residual method (WBR) and the hot money "narrow" method (HMN). Both these methods rely on anomalies in the balance of payment (BoP) identity: The WBR captures the difference between recorded inflows and recorded uses, which is given by the (negative) sum of the current account balance, net equity flows, change in reserves of the central bank and change in external debt and by the BoPs identity:
Of the components on the right-hand side, however, C+D+E are licit: composed of other short-term capital of other sectors, FPI involving other bonds, and the change in deposit-money banks' foreign assets. As such, the WBR method is likely to exhibit a substantial upwards bias as an estimator of IFF.
The main alternative, the HMN, is given by the remaining right-hand side component, G: NEO. G is simply the balancing residual constructed to maintain the BoP identity, and so serves as an indicator of error -and possibly of illicitness -in the overall capital account. The most well-known estimates, produced by Global Financial Integrity, have shifted from using the WBR method (e.g. Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010) to the HMN (e.g. Kar and Freitas 2011) .
The longest-standing series of estimates, although published for African countries only, are those of Ndikumana and Boyce (e.g. 2010) . These authors also contrast sources and uses of foreign exchange in the capital account, but adjust for exchange rate fluctuations on the value of external debt, for debt writeoffs and for underreported remittances (the latter on the basis of discrepancies between UN IFAD estimates and BoP data).
Both Global Financial Integrity and Boyce and Ndikumana also include a trade-related IFF component as the second part of their flow estimates. While this may include some transfer mispricing by multinationals for the purpose of profit-shifting, trade misinvoicing is a more crude approach to tax reduction than those challenged in the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting action plan, the major international attempt to curtail the activity. Instead, these anomalies are more likely to reveal unrelated party transactions that aim to shift part of one party's income into a different jurisdiction.
In both approaches, the authors use national trade data to establish anomalies in the declared values of total exports and imports, on the basis that these reveal illicit shifts of value. On one view, these estimates are rather conservative. They pick up only one form of trade misinvoicing, which occurs via reinvoicing. The data does not pick up, for example, trade transactions where the misinvoicing is incorporated in the same invoice exchanged between exporter and importer. In addition their data does not pick up misinvoicing of services and intangibles.
Within the same broad approach type are more detailed trade studies, such as those carried out by Zdanowicz (1994, 2005) , United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2012), and these may suggest a need for some caution. Greater confidence is possible in estimates such as the latter which are based on more granular data -at detailed commodity level at least, and ideally at transaction level. The difficulties in obtaining consistent, high-quality data of this type mean that the leading global estimates at present rely instead on national-level data -and serious criticisms, including of the GFI approach, have been raised ( Hong and Pak 2016; Johannesen and Pirttilä 2016; Nitsch 2016 ). An important difference in approach between Boyce and Ndikumana and GFI is that the former net off their estimates of illicit inflows, to obtain a more conservative (and also more volatile) series, while GFI argue that because there is no such thing as net crime it makes sense to consider gross outflows.
While illicit inflows could be considered to counteract detrimental effects of illicit outflows by increasing available capital resources, this position is questionable [see United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2012) and African Union Commission and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2015) for a more detailed discussion] because the damage of IFF to governance may be more important than the net resource effect. The benefits to the economy of illicit financial inflows to the economy may well be less than those of licit inflows, since the illicit inflows may themselves be going to fund the illicit economy (e.g. repatriation of profits by transnational organized criminal organizations may be used to fund expansion of activities in the country in question; the flows could also represent financing of terrorism); or be circumventing regulation or taxation designed to ensure fair competition. For our purposes in this paper, illicit financial inflows seem just as likely as illicit outflows to be distributed as or more unequally than funds in the licit economy, and so our primary interest is in estimates that do not "net out" illicit financial inflows. Figure 1 shows a comparison for estimates of total African IFF, between GFI methodology with WBR and HMN -Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2010) and Kar and Freitas (2011) , respectively -and the Ndikumana and Boyce approach. Note that differences between the series frequently exceed the total value of the lowest estimate. Ndikumana and Boyce demonstrates greater volatility, as would be expected given in particular their use of net rather than gross trade mispricing. At the aggregate level, GFI's updated (HMN) methodology tends to produce the more conservative estimates. These differences provide an important illustration of the sensitivity of estimates to assumptions. Note, too, that these are shown at the aggregate level; disaggregated, there are examples of quite different country patterns over time.
Ndikumana and Boyce have generally focused more on the stock of capital held outside African countries, than on the annual outflows. Similarly, Henry (2012) produces global estimates with a largely common methodology, scaling up from outflows to estimates stocks of capital held offshore. The alternative approach here is to use data on international asset and liability positions in order to establish anomalies in the position of particular jurisdictions. Zucman (2013) follows this line of approach, focusing on a group of pre-determined "tax haven" jurisdictions and the potential undeclared wealth held there. Henry's estimate, reflecting a wider set of asset types and without the limitation on jurisdictions holding assets, is unsurprisingly much larger: in the range of $21 trillion to $32 trillion, compared to around $8 trillion for Zucman. 3 It is possible to estimate the income streams that may accrue on offshore assets.
Both Henry (2012) and Zucman (2013) estimate an offshore income stream of around $190 billion annually (Henry assumes a much more cautious rate of his return, on his much higher estimated stock). When country-level estimates are available, this may provide an alternative source of hidden income data to include in national distribution analysis. However, the additional extrapolations (from outflows to stocks, and then to potential income streams) inevitably add a higher degree of uncertainty. For that reason, we focus here on estimated outflows only, treating these directly as hidden (domestic) income.
We recognize that there are reasons to be cautious about the GFI estimates. In particular, further work is needed on the capital account component, to explore the implications of varying other assumptions and parameters than those in the WBR vs. HMN comparison which has large effects on the results. In addition, it is clear that trade analyses based on more granular data are likely to yield more accurate findings, and this should be pursued.
For the present analysis, however, in which we are primarily interested in considering the potential importance of the phenomenon in relation to national inequality -not, for example, in tracking levels year on year -the GFI estimates are the most appropriate. Table 2 below shows the share of illicit financial outflows (using GFI estimates) in developing countries' GDP, sorted in descending order based on the share of illicit financial outflows in GDP for 2013 (the latest year for which estimates are available from GFI). For many countries, IFF can be well above the accounting threshold for materiality of 5%. For some, often developing countries with smaller economies, that threshold is surpassed many times over. Some of the largest IFF in absolute value, however, relate to larger economies such as Argentina, China, Nigeria and South Africa where the intensity of IFF to GDP is lower.
International Adjustments to National Income Distributions
Two main approaches have been taken in international work to adjust national distributions. That of Lakner and Milanovic (2013) is in part based on Banerjee and Piketty (2010) finding that the discrepancy between Indian national accounts and survey data can be somewhat explained by underreporting by top income earners. Lakner and Milanovic therefore allocate the gap between household final consumption in national accounts and household surveys (where the former is larger) to the top 10%, assuming a Pareto distribution. In effect, this assumes that national accounts are able to pick up total income more accurately than surveys which are subject to individual under-reporting, and that the great bulk of this can be attributed to the top decile. As the authors note, this "should be seen as an approximate first step, in the absence of a more careful analysis using unit-record data" (p. 15). While Anand and Segal (2014) criticize the use of national account means in this way, the broad choice of allocating missing income to the top 10%, although not ideal, is useful as a method.
The second approach is that of Anand and Segal (2014) themselves, who draw on the taxation data from the World Top Incomes Project, and assume that very rich households are simply excluded from surveys:
[W]e assume that the survey data in the Milanovic dataset represent only the bottom 99% of the population in each country. Accordingly we multiply the population in each income group in the surveys by 0.99, and append the top percentile with its income share from the tax data (assuming that its share of 'control' income is equal to its share of survey income).
Data on top incomes is only available for 30 countries, of which Anand and Segal found that only 18-23 had applicable data for any individual year in their analysis. To extrapolate other data Anand and Segal estimate a relationship between the share of the top 10% and the survey mean in the national survey distribution and that of the top 1% in the income tax data. The limitations of the Gini measure are evident in the results. The biggest change found occurs in 2005 and is 4 percentage points, whereas Theil's T shows a dramatically greater equivalent change of 22 percentage points. As noted in Cobham and Sumner (2013) , the Gini becomes increasingly unresponsive at higher levels of inequality, and this is well seen here. It is well known the Gini is overresponsive to changes in the middle relative to changes at the top and bottom of the distribution ( Cowell 2000 ( Cowell , 2007 . As a result, we provide estimates in the following section using both the Gini and the Palma (2011) ratio, which has been proposed as an alternative inequality measure that is both more sensitive to the extremes of the distribution and more responsive at higher levels of inequality (Cobham, Schlogl, and Sumner 2015) .
Adjusting National Distribution Data for Illicit Financial Flows: Approach and Preliminary Results
It is inevitable that flow-to-stock approaches capture IFF that reflect activities other than tax-evading or taxavoiding incomes. However, it is reasonable on the basis of Table 1 to argue that all the hidden outflows reflect hidden incomes, be the motivation related to tax or criminality. In addition, the bulk of multinational company tax avoidance (the type which the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative seeks to address) are hard to detect by these approaches, so the probability of picking up foreign income in this way is relatively small. Nonetheless, many IFF transactions will involve at least some payment, or effective sharing of the illicit income offshore, so it may not make sense to take the entire estimate as national income. Finally, there remain broad concerns that estimation approaches based on anomalies in what is inevitably imperfect data may include "false positives" and so overstate the problem; along with some specific concerns about e.g. whether highly aggregated trade data will produce results consistent with those based on transaction-level analysis; or whether, for example, remittance data is well captured.
For these reasons then, we consider a hypothetical case in which the main flow-to-stock estimates of GFI are considered to represent illicit income, but where they are deflated arbitrarily by 50% to allow for the possibilities of overstatement of IFF, and of IFF representing foreign rather than home income.
Having adjusted flows to 2005 dollars, we combine with similarly adjusted household final consumption expenditure from national accounts. Following Lakner and Milanovic (2013) , we allocate the estimate of undeclared income to the top 10% in its entirety. 4 We present estimates for the Gini, and for the Palma Ratio (see Palma 2011) which is simply the income share of the richest decile, divided by that of the poorest four deciles. All country level estimates are provided in the Table 6. Table 3 below shows the summary statistics for the full sample and restricted sample (most recent). Table 4 shows the largest changes at country level by absolute change of the Gini (more than two points). The mean and median Gini are 0.41 in the full sample. Palma ratios from original survey data are 2.59 and 2.09, respectively for the mean and median in the full sample. The adjustment for illicit flows adds 0.03 or 0.02 to the Gini to bring it to 0.44 (mean) and 0.43 (median). This is a not insignificant adjustment in the sense that it is approximately the same amount of absolute change as top incomes adjustment makes in the Anand and Segal (2014) estimates cited earlier. The adjustment adds 0.1 to the Palma Ratio on average taking it to 3.07 (mean) and 2.42 (median). Again this is not an insignificant amount. Africa and East and Central Europe have the largest individual country adjustments, but beyond this no clear pattern dominates. The four largest adjustments, both relative and absolute, occur for Liberia and Chad (from Palma ratios below 2, to ratios near 2.5), and the more equal Belarus and Tajikistan (from around 1 to around 1.5).
We also consider a case in which IFF accrue in their entirety to those receiving the top 1% of income. 5 In this case, the mean absolute difference in the Gini measure rises to 0.08 and the median difference rises to 0.06. This is now over double the absolute change in inequality that the top incomes adjustment makes in Anand and Segal (2014) . Table 5 below presents the results of this exercise. Dataset used as follows: GFI for the IFF estimates, PovCal for the income distribution data, and United Nations Statistics for national accounts data. In the final paragraph, change the reference from "World Top Incomes Database" to "World Wealth and Incomes Database" as it has changed its name.
Conclusions
There is growing interest in extending income distribution data, typically based on household surveys, to allow for taxable income declarations of the highest earners. No attempt has been made thus far in allowing for undeclared taxable income, or more broadly for adjusting income distribution data to allow for IFF. Making such an adjustment, even for countries with relatively robust survey and tax data, requires a number of contentious assumptions -though arguably less heroic than adjustment for top income -because tax data are lacking for many developing countries. The purpose is thus, as with top income adjustment, intended as illustrative rather than exacting. In short, it is possible to use existing illicit flow estimates in combination with survey distribution data, to consider the potential implications for -here national -income inequality across a wide range of countries.
There are at least three major issues to be considered for any future work. First, what IFF estimates are appropriate to use, and what proportion (e.g. 50% as here, or the entire estimate?). Second, to what part of the income distribution (e.g. top 10% or top 1%) should the adjustment be made? And third, what inequality measure/s are most appropriate to evaluate the adjustment? Our findings here are consistent in the central point. We use the most common IFF estimates but discount by 50%, consider both the Palma ratio and Gini inequality measures, and explore allocating illicit income to the top 10% and the top 1%. In every case, the adjustment to inequality is at least of a level with that found when adjusting for top incomes using tax data. The "uncounted" inequality due to IFF is likely in many cases to be material, in an accounting sense, in relation to our understanding of national income distributions. Our central conclusion is therefore that there is an avenue of research, not least on the three questions above, in order to extend estimates of national income distributions in light of IFF. Finally, these suggestive findings point to the value of greater financial transparency in a number of areas: from continuing international cooperation by tax authorities with the World Top Incomes Tax Database to improve coverage (both geographic and across time), to better data to estimate (and indeed to curtail) IFF -redoubled international commitment to public registers of beneficial ownership, perhaps building towards the global financial registry that Zucman (2013) and Piketty (2014) propose, and a step change in the collection and open publication of bilateral data on the holdings of international asset stocks that would underpin much closer estimates of undeclared overseas income streams. Finally, work on methodologies and estimates will be required for the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals not only to generate a target but to track it. 
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